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COPYRIGHT AS AN ENGINE OF FREE EXPRESSION: 
AN ENGLISH PERSPECTIVE 
Speech 
Dr. U m a  Suthersanen* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In law, whatpka so tainted nnd corrupt 
But, being seasoned with a gracious voice, 
Obscures the show of evil? ' 
Copyright theorists often argue that copyright compromises free 
speech. This is especially true in the United States where many academics, and 
some jurists, have felt alarmed at the encroaching boundaries ofcopyright law 
due to the extension of the term of copyright, and by the expanding range 
of exclusive rights.' At least one free speech jurist argues that copyright law 
compromises free speech principles, and some accommodation of the two 
rights should be reached.' The corollary argument is rarely put forward i.e. 
copyright is the basis for alternative ways of treating, defining and dealing 
with creative works which allows niore free expression. 
This short paper deals with the latter argument from a primarily 
English perspective. This perspective may appear slightly quixotic to scholars 
from both common law and civil law systems as copyright, and freedom of 
Chair, ALAI-UK; Chair, Legal Advisory Board, Creative Con~mons (England & 
Wales); and Reader in Intellectual Properry Law & Policy, School o f  Lnw, Queen Mary, 
Universiry of London. 
I W. Shakespeare, 7he Merc/lant of Venice, Act 3, Scene z. 
z M. Rirnhack, "The Copyright law and Free Speech Affair: Making-up and 
Rre;lking-up". 43 IDEA:jozrrml O f  h t u  And Technology 233 (2003). 
3 E. Bnrendr, "Copyright and Free Speech Theory", in J. Griffiths and U 
Suthersanen. Copyright And Free Speec/~: Comparative And Interatioml Annbser, 
Oxford Univ Press, 2005, p. 1 1 .  
expression, have only been s t a t u t o r i l y  recognised as "human rights" since 
the enactment of the H u m a n  Righrs A c t  1998 (HRA). There has, historically, 
been no positive law in the United Kingdom prior to the HRA, such as 
a Bill of Rights or constitution, recognising human righrs.4 Rather since 
our Glorious Revolution of 1688, the unwritten constitution of the UK, in 
reliance on statutory instruments and judicial decisions, has always stated that 
Parliament was sovereign and unfettered. As one commentator has stated, the 
British constitution can be summed up in eight words: What the Queen in 
Parliament enacts is law.' 
In accordance with such a principle, courts have never been overly 
concerned with human rights in the absence of Parliamentary regulation in 
this area. Instead, concepts such as the tight to privacy and freedom ofexpres- 
sion relied on the recognition of negative civil and political liberties under 
common law: unless and until there is a law against what you are doing, you 
may be free to do anything.' As Barendt notes in his treatise 011 freed on^ of 
Speech: "[. . .] English law took little or no notice ofsuch concepts as "freedom 
ofspeech and "liberty of the press". Legal commentary was then as silent, it 
may be added, as the statute book.'  
Thus, from this historical perspective, the Human Rights Act 1998 
should perhaps be considered one of the few constiturional documents in the 
United Kingdom.' The Act entered into fill1 force in the United Kingdom in 
October 2000, and incorporated for the first time into British legal history, 
4 For a pre-1988 HRA perspective, see M. Zander, A Bill OfRights?, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 3rd ed., 1985. 
5 V. Bogdanor, "Britain and the European Communiry" in J. Jowell and D. Oliver 
(eds.). 7he Changing Constitution, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 1994, p p  1-4. 
6 Cases which recognised a righr to freedom of expression under colnmon law 
include: Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (19901 I AC 109; 
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers [19991 3 WLR rolo (HL); R v. Secretary ofStatc 
for the Home Department, Exp Simrns, [zooo] z AC I I ~  (HL). A very early 
Parliamenrary recognition of freedom of speech bur in rhe limired capacity 
of Parliamentary privilege is in Article 9, of the Bill of Rights, February 13, 
1689 which provides that rhe freedom of speech and debates and proceedings 
in Parliamenr are not to be impeached or questioned in any courr of   lace 
ourside Parliament; see M. Ashley, 777e Glorious Revolrttion Of 1688, Hodder 
& Stoughron, 1966, p. 208. Oliver and Drewry point to this as being anorher 
reinforcement of the sovereignty of Parliament principle. 
7 E. Barendr. Freedom Ofspeech, Oxford Universiry Press, zoo$, p. 40. 
8 l i e  only comparison perhaps being the European Communiries Acr 1972 -see 
R v Eansport Secretary exp.  Fartortame Ltd. [1991] 1 AC 603, 638, 643-644. 
the fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), including 
freedom of expression.) 
2. THE PUBLIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
NATURE OF COPYWGHT LAW 
Copyright law promotes both private and public national and 
international interest. It serves not only authors, producers and 
broadcasters, but also the common weal. As the US Supreme Court has previ- 
ously noted: "The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, 
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a 
balance of competing claims upon the public interest. Creative work is to 
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve 
the cause of broad public availability of literature, music, and the 
other arts".'" 
This dual aspect of copyright law is recognised in international 
copyright law. The preamble to the 1996 WPO Copyright Treaty notes that 
there is: "a need to maintain a balance between rights of authors and the large 
public interest, particularly education, research and access to information" 
Moreover, it is impossible to ignore the public nature of copyright 
law if one accepts the argument that copyright law can be justified under 
the International Bill on Human Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. There is further muted international legal support for the 
proposition that copyright is a human right within the Solemn Declaration 
adopted in the 1986 centenary Assembly of the Berne Union where member 
states declared, inter &a, the following: "Solemnly declare that copyright is 
based on human rights and justice and that authors, as creators of beauty, 
entertainment and learning, deserve that their rights in their creation be rec- 
ognized and effectively protected both in their own country and in all other 
countries of their world;"" 
9 Although the United Kingdom was a signatory of  the European Convention on 
Human llighrs from November 4"', 1950, it was never imporred into domesric 
law. 
10 Fox Film C o y .  v. Doyal 286 US 123.127 (1932) and approved in Sony 
Coyoration ofAmerica v. U ~ i v ~ r s n l  City Studios, fnc., 464 US 417 (1984). 
I I The declaration is reprinted in whole in CPrPrnonies du cmtiime anniversuire de 
la Cortvention de Berne, 22 Copyright 367-375 (1986). 
1 
From this general rhetoric, we can extrapolate the following three 
I 
bases under human rights law as to why enlightened and democratic societieg 
confer rights not only on creators but also on performers, producers and 
I 
I 
broadcasters." I 
2.1. Copyright as a cruil and pobtzcal human rzght 
It is the natural right of an individual to have some cla~m to the 
I 
I 
fruits of his labour. Such a r ~ g h t  may be a strong exclusive property right, or l 
a lesser right to object to the misappropriation of his labour by others, or n 
claim to an equitable remuneration or some other restitutionary claim." This 1 
I 
type of claim can be equated to the body of cldssical (and indiv~dual) civil I 
and political rights - the traditional bastion developed by liberals during the I 
Enlightenment - which guarantees the rights of the private individual such as 
the right to life, liberty and human dignity.'4 These rights have also always been I 
advocated by the Western states as constlruting not only [he foundat~ons of I 
democracy but also the rights of the creators. Under German law, for instance, I I 
the German courts have expressly accepted that the rights to human d ~ g n ~ r y  b 
( 
and personal development also constitute the bas~s for author's r~ghts . '~  
I 
2.2.  Copyright as a social, economrc and cultzdral rzght 
The economic and moral rights of authors are recognised, for example, 
as economic and cultural rights under Article 27, Universal Declaration of 
12 For a further d~scussron on the human rlghts basic of copyright law, see U 
Suthersanen, "Human kghts and International Copyright Law", In J Griffirhs I 
and U Suthersanen (eds ), Copyrtghr And Free Speech A Compararrve And I 
lnterr~arronal Analyses, Oxford University Prcs, 2005 I 
T Hobbes, 7he Levrarhun, 1652 J Locke, 7he Ttuo Eeatrses, 1690 
"[lit is the privilege and proper condlt~on ofa human being . to use and 
1 
interpret experience ~n h ~ s  own way. He who let$ the world, or his own porrion 1 
of  I[, choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculry rhan the 
ape-like one of imitat~on". J.S MIII. On Lrberry, pp 70-71, 124-25 
I 
This IS a natural extenslon of the Hegelian notion that author's r~ghts are for the 
I 
I 
protection of the aurhorlal personallcy, rather rhan for the author's labour and 
skill - see G Hegel, Phtlosop/y Of Rtght, (tr TM Knox) Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1952, paragraph 68 The intersection between moral rights and hutnan 
rights IS clearly seen in Re Neo-Fmrsr Slant In Copyrtghr Works, where rhe 
German Reglonal Court of Appeal, held thar an author's right was based on 
a mixture of fundamental constitut~onal pr~nciples as well as fundamental 
freedoms Case 11 U 63/94, Oberlandesgericht (Reglonal Court ofAppeal), 
(Frankfurt Am Man), 6 December 1994. [1996] ECC 375 
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Human Rights (UDHR), and Article 15, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Moral rights protection is further 
boosted by Article 17, ICESCR. UK copyright law, which ordinarily tends 
towards a more economic based reasoning, accepts that one basis of copyright 
law is the fundamental right to enjoyment of property under the rS' Protocol, 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).'" 
A hrther comment should be made in relation to Article 15, ICESCR. 
This is a wide provision which enjoins States to recognize the right of everyone 
to: 
a. To take part in cultural life; 
b. To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
c. To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author. 
Article 1 5  identifies a need to balance the protection of both public 
and private interests in intellectual property. The traditional interpretation 
of Article 15 is that it promotes access to scientific and cultural goods, whilst 
guaranteeing the protection of those "authors" (including inventors, designers, 
etc) of scientific and cultural goods, without specifying the modalities of 
such protection.'' This reading of the law allows one to regard intellectual 
property rights as human rights This view is further reinforced in national and 
regional jurisprudence. In a recent groundbreaking decision, the European 
Court of Human Rights held that intellectual property "undeniably attracted 
the protection of Article I of Protocol No. I [of ECHR]". Furthermore, this 
protection extends to a trade mark registration as well.'R 
I 6 A S ~ ~ O I ( I N  11 TrlrLgraph Grorrp L d  [zooz] ECDR jz, The European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), in contrast, has no equivalent provision in respect of 
intellectual property rights though courts have accepted that there is a muted 
basis for copyright in Article I, I" Protocol, ECHR, which promises peaceful 
enjoyment of "possessions". 
17 The drafting history of this provision shows that one original intenrion was 
that the provision should guarantee a moral right to the scientist and the 
artist, against plagiarism, theft, mutilation and unwarranted use. See M. Green, 
"Drafting History of the Article 15(r)(c) of the International Covenant", UN 
Doc. E/C.~zlzoool~y (Oct. 9, zooo), pp.7-8. 
18 See AN/IPIL(P~-BIUC~ lnc. u. Portu,yf, European Court of Human Rights, Grand 
Chamber, No. 73049101, 11 Jani~ary 2007. 
-. .- 
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Perhaps a more extreme reading of Article I T ,  ICESCR would allow 
one to recognise the entrepreneurial efforts of ~roducers  and broadcasters, 
and the role played by these corporations in disseminating the creative works 
of individual authors and performers. Indeed, Article ry(z) ICESCR calls 
for States to cake steps to achieve the full realization of this right including 
"those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of 
science and culture". 
2.3. Copyright as a collective human right 
Intellectual property rights as a whole, including copyright, can be 
justified on the grounds of "collective human rights". This last basis of rlghts 
usually reflects post-colonial demands to secure rights to collectives such as 
national minorities (or indigenous groups) or rights to development or self- 
determination.I9 This category of rights reminds us that the term "human rights" 
should not merely refer to individualistic concerns but also to the protection 
of activities and relations that make individuals' lives more valuable since such 
rights straddle both private, individual interests and public com~nunitarian 
interests.'" Indeed, it is recognised that an emphasis on individual rights 
undermines both economic and social values, many of which can only be 
enjoyed collectively. An example of this approach can be seen in respect of 
claims of indigenous peoples to the right of property, including copyright 
protection to indigenous artworks." 
3. COPYRIGHT NEEDS FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Both classical and modern rights theories state that the existence 
and exercise of some rights presupposes the existence ofother rights. Property 
rights are accompanied by rights of freedom which are, in turn, accompanied 
by welfare rights. Drahos points out, for example, that the right to education 
aids the meaningful exercise of a right of freedom of speech." He further 
J Morslnk, 7he Unrversal Declararron of Human Rtghrr. Phi1adelph1.1, U n ~ v  of 
Penn Press. 1999. Chapter 3, pp 210-212. 
20 S .  Lukes, "Five fables about human rights", 40 Drsrent 427 (1993). 
21 For a dtscussion of this. see J Griffiths. "Copyright and its complex and varylng 
contexts, In E Macmlllan and K. Bowrey (eds ). Neru Drrecrronc tn Copyrrght 
Law. Edward Elgar, 2006. 
I? Drahos, "Intellectual property and Iiunlan rights". J lnreNertuu/ Proprrry 
QuartErly 349-371 (1999). 
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argues the rights created through the enactment of intellectual property laws 
are instrumental rights, and as such should serve the interests and needs that 
citizens identify through the language of hunian rights as being fundamental 
for example, access to health and to education. Thus, intellectual property 
rights should be pressed into service on behalf of human rights. This is not 
necessarily converse to economic theory. Although classical capitalist theory 
dictates that rnarket regulation yrioritise private interests above public inter- 
est, the best climate for the production of knowledge is not only a market 
structure with legal protection but also a market structure which allows for the 
taking and borrowing of knowledge. The creation of all intellectual property 
depends on fundamental human rights of others being respected such as the 
right to freedom of expression, and the right to education. 
Article 19, UDHR and Article 19 (2) of the 19G6 International Cov- 
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantee the right to freedom 
ofexpression. This right is wide: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receiveandimpart informa- 
tion andidens ofall kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice". 
Copyright law is implicitly recognised as part of this package in 
that the right to freedom of expression is condition on respecting the rights 
or reputations of others which are prescribed by law and are necessary." The 
in teraction is further recognised in Article 15 ,  ICESCR which states as follows: 
"The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the)eedom 
indispensable for scientrfic research and creative activity". 
Within the European framework, many of the Fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed under the ECHR as well, in that most of the freedoms are qualified 
rights but also antithetical in character. This is overwhelmingly so in the case 
of copyriglit which is obviously affected by Article 10 of the ECHR which 
guarantees the right to freedom of expression. O n  the other hand, Article 10 
(2) allows that the exercise of freedom of expression be subjected to restrictions 
as prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for theprotec- 
tion ofrhe rights ofothers. Presumably, this includes the rights of the copyright 
owner (including performers and producers). Furthermore Article I of the 
First Protocol ECHR provides that no one should be deprived of possessions 
except in the public interest. 
23 Art. 19(3), ICCPR. 
4. INTRINSIC TOOLS TO RECOGNISE FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION- THE UK ASHDOWVDECISION 
Authors' rights under copyright law are not absoli~te but are subject 
to refinements and curtailments. Examples of these under national laws include 
the "idea-expression dichotomy" (international) or the fair dealing (UK) or 
fair use (US) defences, or kleine Muenze orfieie benutzung ( G e r n ~ a n y ) . ~  
Some of these statutory (and sornetinles judicial) rules, exceptions 
and limitations allow courts to claim that freedom ofexpression is recognised 
within copyright law. 
Neverrheless, this is a tricky balancing act as was shown in the UK 
Ashdown deci~ion.~ '  The case involved the attempt by Paddy Ashdown (a 
former leader of a British political parry called the Liberal Democrat Party) 
to obtain an injunction to stop a British newspaper B e  Daily Telegraph from 
printing a verbatim copy o f a  confidential memo between Ashdown and the 
then British Prime Minister Tony Blair. 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the internal conflict within 
the human rights legislation in that most of the fundamental freedoms, in 
similar to copyright law, were qualified rights, and hence it fell to the court 
to undertake a balancing exercise. It held thar while Article 10, ECHR guar- 
antees the right to impart information and ideas, Article 10(2) curtailed this 
right in instances where there was an equal duty not to infringe the rights of 
others such as the right to protection of property as guaranteed by Article I 
of the First Protocol, ECHR. In its opinion, the infringement of copyright 
constituted interference with the "peaceful enjoyment of possessions", and 
hence was a breach ofArticle I ,  First Protocol. 
Some of the Court's pronouncements are nevertheless puzzling. For 
instance, the Court accepted that both copyright and the right to freedom of 
expression were antithetical in nature because "it prevented anybody except 
the owner from expressing the information in the same form as thar which 
it protected. Copyright, however, served only to protect the author's specific 
verbal formula of the written work; it did not normally prevent publication 
24 See chaprers 7 and 10, J.A.L. Srerling, World Co/yright Law, Sweer & Mxxu,ell, 
znd ed., 2003. 
25 Ashdown u Tekgraph Group Ltd. [ ~ O O Z ]  ECDR 32. 
of the information in an alternative form and would not normally, therefore, 
encroach too significantly on the freedom of expression" 
l i u s ,  the premise appears to have been that the right to freedom 
of expression would usually be automatically preserved in relation to using a 
copyright work as copyright law did nor forbid a parry from using information 
and ideas, but rather the form in which those ideas and information are set 
out. The Ashdown Court emphasised that the concept of freedom of expres- 
sion was limited to "ideas" and "information", and it did not allow one to 
misappropriate the "the form of words devised by somebody else". 
Of  course, the Court is clearly signalling the importance of main- 
taining the idea-expression principle in copyright law as it is one means of 
ensuring the principle of freedom of expression. Yet, we know that the idea- 
expression dichotomy is fiendishly difficult to apply. Moreover, it makes no 
sense whatsoever in decisions involving copying of original eLernents or non- 
literal copying where the expression is not copied.16 
However, the Ashdown Court went further to admit that Article ro, 
ECHR can, in some circumstances, take precedence over the property right to 
allow the taking of the form or expression of the work. In such situations, the 
Ashdown Court agreed that parties may, in rare circumstances, and despite the 
express statutory exceptions under the copyright law, use the copyright work 
verbatim based on the right of freedom ofexpression.'7 It cited, with approval, 
the European Court on Human Rights in Fressoz and Roire v. France" with 
respect to Article 10, ECHR: "In essence, that Article leaves it for journal- 
ists to decide whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such documents 
to ensure credibiliry. It protects journalists' right to divulge information on 
issues of general interest provided that they are acting in good faith and on 
an accurate factual basis and provide "reliable and precise" information in 
accordance with the ethics of journalism".'9 
26 See for instance Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams ( k i k s )  Limited 
Designen Guild LtA. [ZOOI] I WLR 2416, where the House o f  Lords held that 
"the original elements in the plot o f  a play or novel may be a substantial part, so 
that copyright may be infringed by a work which does not reproduce a single 
sentence o f  the original. I fone  asks what is being protected in such a case, it is 
difficult to give any answer except that i t  is an idea expressed in the copyright 
work.  
27 [zoor] HRLR 57 (CA), paragraphs 28,39-45. 
28 5 BHRC 654 (1999). 
29 Ibid, paragraph 54. 
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TheRFhdown Court of Appeal then proceeded further to identify 
the second plank within UK copyright law which accommodated freedom of 
expression concerns - the exceptions within the copyright law. Of particular 
importance, the Court held, were the defence of fair dealing as set O L I ~  in s. 
30 of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Acr 1988, and the common 
law defence of  "public interest" which subsisted by virtue of s. 171(3) of the 
said same Act. 
4.2. Summary of F i r  dealing" 
The Ashdown court's reasoning as to whether copying was to be 
deemed fair or unfair is important as it was applied later irr toto to the public 
interest and human rights arguments. The court concluded that the publica- 
tion of the copyright work was ilnsupportable under the fair dealing defence 
for a variety of reasons. 
A brief explanation of the UK fair dealing concept is perhaps in 
order here. Unlike the concept of "fair use" under the U.S. Copyright Act 
1976, fair dealing is a circumscribed defence which is available only for the 
purposes of private study, research, criticism, review and reporting of cilrrenr 
events. Firsc introduced under the 1911 Copyright Act'", Parliament's intention 
in introducing the defence of fair dealing was clearly to codify pre-existing 
case law which had accepted that certain rypes ofsubstantial takings would be 
condoned on the grounds ofNfair quotation"" or "real and fair abridgement"." 
It is unclear whether the pre-1911 cases were intended by the courts to offer 
a more generous defence more akin to the US "fair use" type of defence," or 
a narrow defence limited to specific cases. Nevertheless, "use" of copyright 
works without authorisation was reduced to the current formula of "fair deal- 
ing" for narrowly defined purposes. 
"Fair dealing" is not defined within the statute '.+and guidance must 
be sought solely from the courts and academic treatises. Many of the decisions 
discussing fair dealing have adopced a reasonable approach as to the scope of 
3 0  s.2, 1911 CA; and later, in s.6, 1956 CA. 
31 Bradbury v. Hotten, 8 L R  Ex I (1872). 
32 Gyks v. Wilcox, z Ark. 141 (1741) 
33 Roberr Walker LJ agreed, in Pro Sieben v. C~zrlton [1999] RJQ 610, 618, rh:~t 
there had been a general "fair we" doctrine under pre-1911 CA. 
34 Sections 29 and 30, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
the "fair dealing" defence. The Court of Appeal, in Hubbard u Vospefil, were 
particularly generous in mapping the scope of the fair dealing defence: 
. the defence is not confined to published works, but can apply to 
the publication of unpublished works; 
. 
"fair dealing" is a question of degree and must be a matter of 
impression, with the court looking to the number and extent of 
quotations and extracts; 
. is the use for comment, criticism or review as opposed to rival or 
competitive use; 
. if a defendant has the reasonable defences of fair dealing and 
public interest, they should not be restrained from publication by 
interlocutory injunction because such a defendant "if he is right, 
is entitled to publish it: and the law will not intervene to suppress 
freedom of speech except when it is abused".j6 
Clearly, the appellate court in Hubbard was conscious of the nexus 
benveen Fair dealing, public interest and freedom ofspeech; the court, however, 
went no further with this statement. It was left to future courts and laws to 
determine whether the fair dealing defence is synonymous with freedom of 
expression. 
4.3. Aligning fair dealing with fieedom of speech 
The Ashdown court was critical as to the substantiality of the 
taking, as well as the motive of the defendant, observing that the defend- 
ant had appropriated the most important passages in the minute had been 
used to make the "article more attractive to read and will have been of 
significant commercial value in enabling the Sunday Telegraph to maintain, 
if not to enhance, the loyalty of its readership"." 
However, why should the substantiality of copying or  the com- 
mercial purpose of the copying be relevant in considering "freedom of 
expression" concerns? Moreover, surely it goes without saying that the 
question ofsubstantiality of taking will nearly always be answered in favour 
of the claimant as infringement only occurs when a substantial part of the 
36 /bid, per Denning M.R. ,  p. 97. 
- --- - -- - - - 
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copyright work, qualitatively and quantitatively, has been taken! 
The Ashdown Court further held that the newspaper's publication 
competed with the claimant's future market for derivative works and thar the 
defendant's scoop had devalued the memoirs which Ashdown eventually sold. 
It is questionable whether the defendant's verbatim copying was substitutive 
of the claimant's market for the diaries - would the newspaper article have 
injured the claimant's sale of his diaries, or is it more likely that it would 
have done the reverse and served in many ways to heighten the anticipated 
publication of the diaries?'' 
Indeed courts are unduly concerned with the insalubrious nature 
of press reporting when it comes to questions of copyright infringement and 
the fair dealing defence. Part of the reason is echoed in an earlier Court of 
Appeal decision which advocated that courts take heed of the fact thar the 
media is not an altruistic trade, and as such is "peculiarly vulnerable to the 
error of confusing the public interest with their own interest"." This may be 
a genuine concern in relation to copyright infringement, but i t  is not reason- 
able when the legal issue is also one of freedom of expression. 
A pragmatic opinion expressed by Jacob J. (now Lord Justice Jacob), 
in Hyde Park Residence v. Yelland is that "the press often have to pay for infor- 
mation of public importance and when they publish they will always expect 
to make money. They are not philanthropists. I d o  not think thar the fact that 
M r  [MI was paid and that The Sun expected to make money derogates in any 
way from the "fair dealing'' (or any public interest)  justification".^^ 
A different stance as to why interference with press publication 
was a matter of concern was offered by Lord Woolf C.J. in A v. B&C: 
"The fact that if the injunction is granted it will interfere with the freedom of 
expression of others and in particular the freedom of the press is a matter of 
particular importance. 'This well-established common law principle is under- 
lined by section 12(4) [of the Human Rights Act 19981. Any interference with 
the press has to be justified because it inevitably has some effect on the ability 
38 The Court ofAppeal also considered rhe taking unfair since rhe minute was 
secrer and "undoubtedly obtained in breach of confidence". The court relied 
on the fact thar whether a work is unpublished or nor is a relevant hctor in 
considering wherher usage is fair or not. [zoo11 HRLR 57 (CA), paragraph 75. 
39 [1985] Q B  526, 537; ciring Franrorne v. Mirror Group Newspapers Lrd. [1984] I 
WLR 892,898. 
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of the press to ~e r fo rm its role in society. 'This is the position irrespective of 
whether a particular publication is desirable in the public interest. The exist- 
ence of a free press is in itself desirable and so any interference with it has to 
be justified.. .Regardless of the quality of the material which it is intended to 
publish prima facie the court should not interfere with its ~ublication. Any 
interference with publication must be j~stified".~' 
Of  course, these are views expressed in relation to whether the 
right to freedom of expression trumps an individual's right to privacy in 
respect of injunctive relief - but they are highly relevant in considering how 
the balance between property rights and the right to freedom of expression 
is to be made. 
4.4. A constitutionnl 3ublic interest" defence? 
O n  the other hand, the Ashdozun court's view was that the &r dealing 
defence was already predisposed towards freedom of expression, and public 
interest. It stated that public interest considerations could override copyright, 
though under undefined circumstances.~'. In the Court's view, the fair dealing 
defence "will normally afford the Court all the scope that it needs properly 
to reflect the public interest in freedom of expression and, in particular, the 
freedom of the press. 'There will then be no need to give separate consideration 
to the availability of a public interest defence under section I ~ I " . ~ '  
What is this public interest "defence? British judges, sometimes, in- 
dulge in law making. The theoretical position constitutionally is that this does 
not happen. The theory sits Parliament and the Courts as the two branches 
of government which straddle the opposite ends of the constitutional divide. 
The tacit agreement between the two is that Parliament is precluded from 
criticising individual judges, whilst the courts adopt legislative sovereignry 
implacably. However, as Oliver and Drewry state: "The supreme law-making 
power exercised by the sovereign Parliament of the UK ostensibly relegates 
the courts to a passive, even submissive, role in applying and interpreting 
legislation. Recently, however, a number of extra-judicial observations have 
raised the possibiliry that the courts could refuse to give effect to a statutory 
provision that was in some respects profoundly undemocratic. For instance, 
41 [ZOOZ] EWCA C i v  337, paragraphs I I ( V ) ,  ( v i ) .  
42 [ z o o 1 1  HRLR 57 (CA), paragraph $3. 
43 Ihid., paragraph 66. 
Sir John Lawsd4 and Lord Woolf of Barnes45 have both made this point. There 
are also academic arguments in favour of such a position":16 
Judges only depart from the principle of parliamenrary sovereignty 
if fundamental democratic principles are threatened. One such fundamental 
democratic principle was perhaps the right to freedom ofexpression. Historically, 
one reason why the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act has a statutorily 
recognised "public interest" defence is that this judge-made principle surfaced 
when the British courts were deciding on simultaneous actions of breach of 
confidentiality and copyright. Indeed, the first real discussion of the "public 
interest" defence occurs in cases dealing with breach of confidence where one 
sees a whole line of unhesitating jurisprudence accepting that an action of 
confidentiality was qualified by a general "public interest" defence.': 
Having accepted, in many cases, the "public interest" defence in 
respect of the breach of confidentiality action, courts imported the same 
reasoning and result into the copyright action as well. The defence was well 
and truly accepted within copyright law in BeIofv Pressdram, where the court 
held that the public interest is a defence which "is outside and independent 
of statutes, is not limited to copyright cases and is based upon a general 
principle of common law".48 
In any event, whatever the basis of the defence within copyright law, 
Parliament introduced section 171(3) into the 1988 copyright legislation which 
states: "Nothing in this Part affects any rule of law preventing or restricting 
the enforcement of copyright, on grounds of public interest or otherwise". 
Is this Parliament's weapon to protect human rights concerns such 
as the right of privacy and the right to freedom of speech prior to the enact- 
44 Sir John Laws, "Law And Democracy", Public LLI~U 72 (1995) 
45 Lord Woolf, "Droir Public - English Stylew, Aiblir Lotu 57 (1995). 
46 D. Oliver and G. Drewry, 7hr Lrrw rmdParLiamrnt. 1998 ;ir 5-6.8: and also AW 
Bradley, "The sovereignty ofParliament - its perpetuity"? in JL Jowell and D 
Oliver (eds.) %c Cbnnging Constitution, 3"l edition, 1994. 
47 fnitialSeruices Ltd. u. Putrrrill 11968) I Q B  396; Frasrr u. Er/tzns [1969] I Q B  j49; 
Hubbard u. Vosper [1972] 2 Q B  84; Woodward u. H~itcI~ins [1977] 1 WLR 760: 
and per Lord Denning M.R. (dissenring) in Scbering Cbemicolr Ltd. 1). Folknran 
Ltd [r982] Q B  I; British Sterl Corporation u. Grtmadd TPmision Lrd. [1981] A C  
48 Brloffv Pressdram I19731 RPC 765,78z. per Ungoed-Thomas J .  The court 
appear:, ro have incorporated the defence by wrongly relying o n ,  ;IS precedents, 
Hubbard and Initial Services. 
rnent of the Human Rights Act in the UK? Is the "public interest" defence an 
z~her-&jnce which overrides copyright? Is i t  the English human rights tool? 
One interpretation ofs.171(3) is that public interest considerations 
asserted itself not merely as a statutorily-recognised defence but rather as a 
rule. Moreover, this is a constitutionally mandated device, having first been 
employed by judges as a defence, and then subsequently ratified by Parliament 
as a rule of law. It is not immediately clear under what circumstances it can 
be employed though Professor Cornish maintains that the public interest rule 
can be seen to favour rwo types of distinct policies: 
a) a policy against legal protection whereby the courts have refused 
relief on the basis of express disapproval of the content of the work 
because obscene, immoral, defamatory, blasphemous, irreligious, 
or seriously deceptive of public; 
b) A policy favouring dissemination of the material.49 
Thus, there is some basis for arguing that s. 171(3) promotes a 
wider, constitutional public interest rule, as opposed to merely a defence. A 
rule which perhaps asserts that the fair dealing defences within our copyright 
law are not to be equated to human rights principles, and d o  not incorporate 
human rights concerns. The latter have to be tested differently. The analysis 
of the decisions shows that the "public interest" rule comes up where courts 
are torn between individual rights on the one hand (such as copyright), and 
communitarian interests, on the other. In particular, the "public interest" 
defence or rule may be invoked when there has been an interference with the 
freedom of expression, including freedom of the press. 
W b  the Ashdown decision isprobably wrong. Is a UK court then to 
equate both the public interest and human rights defences with the statutory 
defence of fair dealing? If so, this is tantamount to an implicit rejection of a 
specific human rights argument with respect to copyright law. It is, of course, 
arguable that the Court did consider the human rights argument when it stated 
that the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 constituted a further 
line of enquiry: "Are the facts of this case such that, arguably, the importance 
of freedom of expression outweighs the conventional considerations set out 
49 Enlphasis added. W.R.Cornish, Intelhctual Property, Sweet & Maxwell, 4Ih 
ed., 1989, paragraphs 11-55, Cornish's classification remains inconclusive as 
it suggests that courts will do as they will. For judicial approval of Cornish's 
classificarion of the public interest defence, see Hyde Park Residn?ces v Yelland 
\[999\ ,\PC 655,667-669. 
above so as to afford the Telegraph Group a defence of fair dealing?"jO 
The answer was in the negative because the same fair dealing con- 
siderations were applied to the human rights defence: "We d o  not, however, 
consider that it is arguable that there was any justification for the extent of the 
reproduction of Mr Ashdown's own words. It appears to us that the minute 
was deliberately filleted in order to extract colourful passages that were most 
likely to add flavour to the article and thus to appeal to the readership of the 
newspaper. M r  Ashdown's work product was deployed in the way that it was 
for reasons that were essentially journalistic in furtherance of the commercial 
interests of theTelegraph Group. We do not consider it arguable that Article 
10 [ECHR] requires that the Group should be able to profit from this use of 
Mr Ashdown's copyright without paying compensation"." 
As stated above, these are highly contestable points when considered 
from a human rights angle: 
(a) The work copied constituted a fraction ofthe entire protected work. 
It does not seem legitimate to restrict the exercise of the freedom 
of expression to insubstantial and unimportant expressions of the 
copyrightwork?'The fact that only thecolourful, and hencevaluable, 
passages of the minute which would appeal to the readership of 
the newspaper, were appropriated is a showing of qualitative 
taking in respect of an analysis on copyright infringement. Why 
should this be relevant for a freedom of expression analysis? 
(b) No  authority was offered for the sweeping proposition that a third 
party's use of the copyright work under Article 10, ECHR must 
be compensated for. Even the copyright statute does not demand 
that remuneration be paid for a fair dealing of a copyright work,%' 
and this has never been a concern under the public interest defence. 
Furthermore, it cannot be legitimate to restrict a third party's use 
of the copyright work, especially where he seeks to criticise the 
5 0  Ibid., 78. 
51 Ibid., paragraph 82. 
52 Secrions 29 and 30(1), CDPA 1988. The Act calls for a sufficient 
acknowledgement of  rhe source when use is made For news reporting. The Act 
does expressly indicate the instances when the "commercial" element should 
bear a considerable role in the fair dealing analysis as - see For example, secrion 
z9(1), CDPA 1988 which only allows fair dealing For rhe purposes oFUnon- 
conimercial" research. 
work, to situations where the copyright owner's permission is 
sought and paid for. 
(c) The assumption that Article 10 ECHR cannot justify the use of 
another's work for commercial and essentially journalistic purposes 
is a draconian interpretation of the concept of "freedom of 
expression". Moreover, in relation to verbatim copying of the text, 
the Court held that an extensive reproduction of Mr Ashdown's 
own words was not necessary in order to satisfy a newspaper 
reader that the account was both credible and authoritative: the 
defendant could have done what other newspapers had done and 
reported the event without resorting to the secret memo. 
Indeed, nothing can be faulted with the court's theoretical stance, 
and it did note that a court must consider whether on the facts of the case 
before it, the importance of freedom of expression outweighed the conventional 
considerations in a defence of fair dealing. And one can say the Ashdown deci- 
sion shows a UK court accepting the important principle that some analysis 
of the human rights implications has to be undertaken. 
Practically speaking, the application of these principles by the Court 
of Appeal shows a rather ambivalent policy towards the public interest and 
human rights defences. The court opted to apply its fair dealing analysis across 
the board and refrained from undertaking a fresh analysis in relation to the 
other two defences of public interest and human rights. The court seems to 
have thought that elements such as substantiality of rhe taking, nature and 
quality of the work and commercial considerations of the defendant are the 
correct criteria for consideration in adjudicating on free speech. Moreover, 
the case appears to stand for the proposition that, whatever constituted the 
public inrerest rule, the constitutional changes effected by the 1998 Act shifts 
the balance back to the "fair dealing" analysis. 
A more cogent line of analysis would ask whether Article IO(I) 
specifically allows copyright to be restrained to allow verbatim copying of a 
substantial amount of literary text, and if so, for what reasons? 
5. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ALLOWS 
"SUBSTANTIAL COPYING OF LITERAL WORKS 
FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES" 
What lessons can we learn from this decision? 
- . - - - - - - - - -- - -  - .- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. - - . - - - . - - - 
DERECHO OE AUTOR Y LIRERTAD DF, E X P R E S I ~ N  
DROIT I)'AUI,EIIR ET I.IRERT& I)'EXPRF,SSION 
COPYRIGH'J AND F R E E I ~ M  OF EXI'RESSION 1 ~ 3  
1 
i 
It may be true that national copyright laws do take freedom of 1 
expression concerns into account by limiting the scope of protection in a 
myriad of ways from allowing others to appropriate a work for pdrodic use 
or for criticism purposes, to excluding ideas and principles from protection. 
But this is nor enough. 
J. I .  CotlK? psychology 
Freedom of expression does not subsist as a subset of copyrighr 
law, but is a fundamental right of the alleged copyright infringer. Courts 
need to grasp that when a defendant pleads "freedom of expressionw, it is 
not a defence but a counter-claim. The copyright owner is now the alleged 
infringer. This requires a psychological shift within the courtroom as it 
considers rwo competing and complementary rights and claims. 'The defend- 
ant becomes a claimantlor plaintiff who is pleading that his fundamental 
freedom has been breached. The parodist is claiming that he, the creator of 
a new work, is being stifled in expressing his art, especially if it is political 
art." 'The newspaper journalist is claiming that his "speech" to the public is 
protected expression irrespective of the economic interests that lie motivates 
his employers. He  claims he has a right to choose the form of his expression, 
as well as the contents. 
5.2. Contextual displacement and authentication 
Both the artist and journalist are claiming that freedom of expres- 
sion allows them, perhaps, to use a copyright protected image or a copyright 
protected text as they are without any changes because the artist and the 
reporter alter the context within which the protected work appears. Perhaps 
we need to protect those who create new expressions merely by displacing 
works from one to another context and audience. 
The parodist should be able to argue that appropriating copyright 
protected images and characters and displacing them into a different context 
is protected expression under human rights law. Consider the following 
taking Walt Disney's characters such as Mickey Mouse, Minnie 
Mouse and Pluto the Dog and contextually displaced them by 
abandoning their wholesome values and making them indulge 
in sex and drugs;(4 
See Urctnrgung B~kiender hirnstkr Au~trta, [zoo71 ECDR 181 [European Court 
o f  Human R~ghcs]. 
Walt D t s n ~  Prods I! Arr I'1rate3, 581 Ezd 7j1, 756-7551 (9th Clr 1978) [The US 
-- - - a - 
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taking cute comic Asterix characters such as Asterix and Obelix 
and placing both the fictional characters and the real artist 
in disparaging contexts i.e. as an alcoholic and as a copyright 
lawyer5~ 
Should we forbid the newspaper reporter from using copyright- 
protected authentic versions of text or images in the course of his reporting 
activities? Does not the public interest rule, at least in UK law, clearly apply in 
the context of "communication ofwhat is essentially information--information 
clothed in copyright"?5%en a journalists or researcher employs protected text 
or images, i t  can be that nothing else can convey the factual data sufficiently. 
Indeed, as many have previously noted, sometimes such works are the most 
convincing and credible means of reporting to the public." The European 
Court of Human Rights readily agrees that courts should not substitute their 
judgements as to what is the best manner for reporting a particular news 
item.'" 
5.3. Public debate and pure commercial speech 
Indeed, contrary to the manner in which the Ashdown court 
treated press reporting, newspaper articles are a far more noble and elevated 
type of expression than pure "commercial speech" insofar as human rights 
classifications are concerned. An example of a pure commercial speech is an 
advertisement. And in the case of the latter, the European Court of Human 
Rights has held that: 
Circuit Court rejected the freedom of expression claim, holding that they had 
infringed copyright.] 
5 5 BGH, March 11, 1993; GRUR 206 (1994); 25 IfC6og (1994). 'The German 
Supreme Court allowed the parody using the German copyright principle 
of je i r  Benunurrgand the German constitutional principle of freedom of 
expression which includes freedom of art - see section 24, Gernia~i Copyright 
Law, and Article ~ ( 3 )  of the German Basic Law. 
56 Hydr Pdrk Rexidenre u. YeLland. [1999] RPC 675 (Ch.D), 671. 
57 See for example, Erne, Inc. u Bernard Geis Associates, 293 E Supp. 130 (SDNY, 
1968); and M.B. Ninimer, "Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?", 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1197-1200 (1970). 
$8 See for example Fressoz and  Roire v France (1999) 5 RHRC 654. paragraph 54 
[The Europeali Court was unambiguous in its view that the taking of the form 
or expression of the work may be allowed if journalists need some credibility in 
order to authenticate their reports]. 
Article 10, ECHR protects such speech;" 
the profit-making purpose is considered irrelevant i.e. neither 
the financial element nor the competition-related promotional E 
statements are excluded from the ambit of protection of Article 10 
ECHR. 60 
This point cannot be emphasised: commercial considerations 
and profit making are not crucial. What is required is a consideration of 
the individual's participation in a "public debate" i.e. a debate affecting the 
general interest to which the individuals expression or speech may c ~ n c e r n . ~ '  
A further criterion is whether or not the contested speech has the potentla1 
of contributing significantly to the above-mentioned debate. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Once more unto the breach, dearfiienh, once more /. . / 
I see you stand ltkegrThounds tn the slips, 
Stratntng upon the start. %egame> afoot: 
Follow your sptritGZ 
If there is one lesson to be learnt from the English Ashdown deci- 
sion, it is that courts are too conservative in embarking on fresh avenues of 
enquiry and analysis when it comes to confronting the copyright-freedom 
of expression nexus. It may be unfair to reap the fruits of another person's 
creative expression, and it may be unjust to appropriate protected properry of 
another person. But d o  we take these elements into account when consider- 
ing whether a defendant is entitled to use a work under his right to freedom 
of expression? 
See Barrhold u Germany, Ba~thold 11 Germnny [i985] 7 EHRR 383; Mukt  Intern 
Verbg GmbHand Klaus Beermnnn u. Germany [1989] 12 EHRR 161; Hertel u 
Swrnerkznd [1998] 28 EHRR 534. 
C I I S ~  Corn u Sparn [1994] 18 E H R R  I ;  Barthold u Germany [r985] 7 EHRR 383. 
Hertel u. Swrtzprkznd, rbrd, paragraph 47. Indeed, rhe unimportance of 
commercial purpose was highlighted in this and in the Barrholdcases ~f one 
compares the stance of  the European Court of Human Rights VIS-H-VIS the
nat~onal German courts. The latter ernphasised the purpose ofspeech, whereas 
the European Court weighed the conlmerclal and non-commerc~al elements by 
applying the "public debare" tesr. 
W Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 3, Scene I .  
One can safely say that despite rumours to the contrary, copyright 
law is not under threat. What copyright law does suffer from is, perhaps, an 
itnage crisis. 
Therefore it behoves us copyright lawyers and jurists to stop ex- 
ploring the basic principles and justifications of copyright law, and to cease 
the endless push for greater rights. These were easy tasks for our forefathers. 
Perhaps this generation's task is to struggle for survival as copyright law is 
constantly attacked in the next 20 years for not taking into account different 
stakeholders' needs. Our  task should be to look at the boundaries between 
copyright law and other laws and ask how we should refine copyright law in 
order to safeguard: 
(a) societal needs (thus safeguarding copyright from human rights at- 
tacks) 
(6) market needs (thus safeguarding copyright from competition law 
attacks) 
(c) contrart~ul needs of individual creators (thus safeguarding cop- 
yright from being refined quietly by the Creative Commons 
"rules"). 
And in the long run, we need to steel ourselves and reform the 
(in)famous three-step test under Article 9 ( 2 ) ,  Berne Convention and Article 13, 
TRIPS Agreement and give it a more enlightened and holistic interpretation 
which takes the above needs into account. 
